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been a number of bull and bear cycles. This paper discusses
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that Chinese listed companies choose to release more earn-
ings during bull markets and this phenomenon is more evi-
dent in companies that are more proﬁtable and have higher
valuations. We also ﬁnd that executives who do not release
more earnings during bull markets are more likely to be
dismissed.
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212 D. Chen et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 4 (2011) 211–232management fraud, accounting information distortion, business failures and loss of inves-
tors’ trust in capital markets. However, the concept of earnings management derived from
Western theories is neutral. Professional judgment is important during the production
process of earnings information. Poor judgment leads to adverse economic consequences,
whereas reasonable judgment can provide more useful earnings information (Wang and
Zhao, 2003). Two main ideas have emerged from empirical studies of earnings manage-
ment: opportunistic behavior and efﬁcient contracting perspectives. Based on John Rawls’
principles of justice and the assumption of individual rationality, Chen (2009) uses con-
tracts as the starting point of analysis and proposes that the efﬁcient contracting perspec-
tive (efﬁcient perspective) is not empirically researchable, and the opportunistic behavior
perspective is not a necessary concept in empirical research. He further suggests that
moral judgment should be excluded from empirical research into earnings management.
Instead, it is important to develop theories of earnings management based on a contract-
ing perspective.
Currently, there is considerable interest in earnings management research, especially in
the motivation for earnings management, such as bonus plans (Healy, 1985; DeAngelo,
1988; Dechow and Sloan, 1991), contract-based motivations (Healy and Palepu, 1990;
Sweeney, 1994; DeAngleo et al., 1994), political costs motivations (Cahan, 1992; Key,
1997) and capital market-based motivations (Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Dechow and Skin-
ner, 2000). However, previous studies report that motivations of earnings management
concentrate on ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors and few studies have investigated the effect of peri-
odic ﬂuctuations in the stock market on earnings management. Does the market-timing
phenomenon that is widely observed in investment and ﬁnance also exist in the release
of accounting earnings information by listed companies?
In the long run, the stock market experiences periodic cycles of boom and bust, or bull
and bear markets, under the combined effects of economic cycles and policy cycles. Under
the bull cycle, supply falls short of demand in the stock market, market participants gen-
erally hold high expectations of the future earnings of companies and low uncertainty of
ﬁrm values, and information asymmetry is low. However, under the bear cycle, supply ex-
ceeds demand, market participants hold lower future earnings expectations and high
uncertainty of ﬁrm values, and information asymmetry increases. Listed companies, as mi-
cro-economic subjects and suppliers of stocks (i.e., security market products) and account-
ing information, may show different characteristics in the production of accounting
information based on adverse selection, supply and demand relations, and market reac-
tions, and decide to release earnings under different market cycles. Thus, this paper pro-
vides preliminary evidence on the timing of earnings under different market cycles.
We ﬁnd that Chinese listed companies choose to release more earnings during bull mar-
kets. This phenomenon is more evident in high-proﬁt enterprises and companies with
higher valuations. Finally, we ﬁnd that executives who do not release more earnings dur-
ing bull markets are more likely to be dismissed.
Few studies have evaluated the relationship between stock market cycles and earnings
management. This is one of the ﬁrst studies to examine how ﬁrms manage earnings in dif-
ferent market situations. These ﬁndings enrich the literature on market timing and earn-
ings management and increase our understanding of interactions between the stock
market and ﬁrm behavior.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the related
literature and discusses the institutional background and theoretical analysis. Section 3
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the empirical models and provides results of the empirical analysis. Conclusions and lim-
itations of this study are presented in Section 5.2. Literature, theory and background
2.1. Market timing
Market timing theory originated in the ﬁeld of capital structure research, following
trade-off and pecking order theories, and is used to explain corporate ﬁnance decision-
making and capital structure formation. Previous studies have found evidence of market
timing in corporate ﬁnance decision-making. Companies are more likely to issue equity in-
stead of debt in expansionary phases of the business cycle and issue debt in contractionary
phases (Hickman, 1953; Moore, 1980). Taggart (1977) and Marsh (1982) report that com-
panies tend to issue equity when stock prices are high (generally in expansionary periods)
and issue debt when bond prices are high or interest rates are low (generally in contrac-
tionary periods).
Different theories exist to explain the market timing phenomenon. Shiller (2004) de-
scribes the stock market in the 1990s as ‘‘an irrational, self-driven, self-expansion foam,’’
in which optimism rather than corporate proﬁt led to a stock market boom in the United
States. Mispricing is used to explain this phenomenon in behavioral ﬁnance: when the
optimism of irrational investors propels the stock price, the stock price is overvalued;
and when the pessimism of irrational investors pushes the stock price down, the stock
price is undervalued. Rational managers issue equity when they believe their stock is over-
valued and the cost is irrationally low; they issue debt or repurchase equity when their
stock is undervalued in order to avoid losses due to the high cost of equity (Stein, 1996;
Baker and Wurgler, 2002).1
As the national economy’s ‘‘barometer’’, the stock market reﬂects the market’s expecta-
tions of future economic activity. The economic cycle is one of the most important factors
affecting stock market ﬂuctuations. Periodic ﬂuctuations in the stock market (boom and
bust) are inﬂuenced by the economic cycle, the national macroeconomic policy cycle and
other external factors. The boom and bust cycle boosts investors’ optimism and pessimism,
but is not determined by investors’ optimism and pessimism. From the perspective of mar-
ket valuation, when the market is in a bull cycle, investors believe that companies are more
likely to be proﬁtable and uncertainties regarding the value of companies are relatively low.
Thus, demand for stocks increases and stock prices generally rise as a result. When the
market enters a bear cycle, companies’ future earnings are expected to decrease and uncer-
tainties regarding the value of companies increase. As a result, demand for stocks decreases
and stock prices drop. Therefore, high and low stock prices are due to investors’ rational
pricing of company value based on economic conditions and the information environment.1 Baker and Wurgler (2002) found that when ﬁrm valuations are high companies always have low leverage; whereas when
ﬁrm valuations are low, companies always have high leverage. Past market valuations have large effects on capital structure.
Whether book value or market value is used to measure leverage, or other variables are controlled for, this relationship is
obvious and persistent. Market timing affects ﬁrm capital structure through equity ﬁnancing; capital structure is largely the
cumulative outcome of past attempts to time the equity market. Although results based on book leverage are unable to detect
that the capital structure affected by market timing is due to mispricing or dynamic information asymmetry, Baker andWurgler
(2002) document that when market leverage is considered, the results further support investors’ mispricing patterns (i.e.,
rational managers issue equity when irrational investors cause the stock price to be overvalued) and market timing will affect
the capital structure for a long time as a result.
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However, from the real options perspective (Carlson et al., 2006), equity issuances by com-
panies transform real options into actual assets. Although risks still exist with actual assets,
they are much smaller than the risks of real options, i.e. the characteristics of the risks have
changed systematically. The stock price decreases with lower risk; therefore, the high stock
price before issuance is not market mispricing.
Lucas and MacDonald (1990) established the asymmetric information dynamic model,
with the hypothesis that both investors and managers are rational, but dynamic informa-
tion asymmetry exists between them, such that managers know more about a project’s
real value than anyone else. Managers want to announce promising investment projects
to increase company value and signal their effort, however, adverse selection causes stock
valuations to be less than equilibrium prices without information asymmetry. Managers
prefer to issue equity when the degree of information asymmetry is low. This information
asymmetry changes over time in different macrocycles (Choe et al., 1993). During a mac-
roeconomic expansion, companies are more likely to have valuable investment projects,
uncertainties about company value decrease, the level of market information asymmetry
is low and companies prefer to issue equity. During a macroeconomic contraction, the ad-
verse selection problem is serious and fewer companies issue equity.
Currently, the market timing theory has been applied to ﬁnancial decision making in ini-
tial public offering (IPO) research (Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Pagano et al., 1998; Liu and
Li, 2005; Wang and Li, 2009), seasoned equity offering (SEO) research (Taggart, 1977;
Marsh, 1982; Jung et al., 1996; Cai and Liu, 2006) and repurchase research (Ikenberry
et al., 1995). The question posed by this study is: Does the market-timing phenomenon
also exist in earnings management? Few studies in the market timing and earnings man-
agement ﬁelds have investigated this issue. However, the earnings management literature
based on the capital market motivation has provided insights into IPO motivations (Teoh
et al., 1998a; Lin and Wei, 2000), SEO motivations (Teoh et al., 1998b; Rangan, 1998; Chen
et al., 2000; Lu and Wei, 2006), loss reversal motivations (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997;
Degeorge et al., 1999; Lu, 1999; Sun and Wang, 1999) and expected earnings motivations
(Burgstahler and Eames, 2006; Wei, 2005). However, stock market cycles, as a potential
motivation for capital market-based earnings management, require further study.
2.2. Timing earnings
In the long term, earnings management does not increase or decrease actual proﬁt, but
changes the proﬁt distribution in different ﬁscal periods.2 With the growth of the economy,
the Chinese stock market has been through several bull and bear cycles since its opening
20 years ago. In the different market phases, differences are apparent in the areas of informa-
tion asymmetry, supply and demand, market valuation and market response. Thus, earnings
management has different characteristics during these different phases.
First, information asymmetry shows dynamic differences under the different macrocy-
cles (Choe et al., 1993). During the bull cycle, the adverse selection problem is lower
because expectations of the proﬁtability of new investments rise, whereas uncertainty2 Besides accruals, Chinese listed companies also manage their earnings through below-the-line items such as related party
transactions and asset disposals (Chen and Yuan, 2004). In the long run, earnings management of below-the-line items may
have no obvious reserve characteristics like accruals, but it may appear periodically with market cycles. This means that the
company’s choice of market opportunity determines when to carry out related party transactions and when to dispose of assets
to increase earnings.
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the adverse selection problem increases because expectations of the proﬁtability of new
investments fall, whereas uncertainty concerning the value of the company rises. To max-
imize market value, and based on future career concerns, rational managers are more
likely to release good news about proﬁts during bull markets, as earnings information is
reﬂected in stock prices in a more timely and accurate manner. If managers release good
news about proﬁts during bear markets, the stock price effects may be discounted by
investors because increased information asymmetry leads to higher adverse selection
costs, which does not reﬂect the intrinsic value of the company.
Second, during different market situations there are different supply and demand
structures. In a bull market, investor demand and participation are higher. Therefore,
the supply of stocks falls short of demand, which always increases stock prices. In addi-
tion, the market value of every dollar of company earnings (PE) and the market value of
every dollar of net assets (PB) are generally higher during bull markets. The more earn-
ings the company releases at this time, the higher the market value it will achieve, so
rational managers tend to release more earnings in these periods. Conversely, in a bear
market, stocks are oversupplied and investor participation is low. The market valuation
of every dollar of earnings (PE) or every dollar of net assets (PB) is generally lower,3 so
rational managers tend to transfer earnings to be released during bull markets.
Finally, the market response to good or bad news in different market situations shows a
signiﬁcant asymmetric information effect (Lu and Xu, 2004; He and Li, 2007). When the
stock market is in a period of prosperity, with good news investors expect the stock price
to rise continuously, which results in higher stock prices. When the stock market is in a
period of contraction, the stock index follows a downward trend. With good news, inves-
tors think that it may be a random change, which produces a small market response. The
market’s asymmetric reaction to good earnings news gives managers a strong motivation
to release gains during bull markets.
This analysis of adverse selection costs, supply and demand relationships and market re-
sponse shows that listed companies take advantage of market opportunities to release
earnings under different market situations. For every ﬁrm, cross-sectional differences in
ﬁrm characteristics may have different effects on the timing of earnings. On the one hand,
market valuation of most stocks is high during bull markets, although some stocks have
low market valuations. Companies with high estimated ﬁrm values are more motivated
to release earnings during bull markets, because the market value for every dollar of earn-
ings or net assets is higher. Although some stock prices are also high during bear markets,
these companies may not release earnings at this time because of adverse selection costs
and small market responses to good news.4 On the other hand, with other conditions un-
changed, high-proﬁt companies can release more earnings stored previously and further
propel stock prices to maximize market value when entering bull markets. However, low-3 In a bear market stock prices are generally low, however, some stocks have high prices for various reasons. For those stocks,
the higher market price motivates companies to release earnings from the supply and demand perspective. However, in a bear
market, information asymmetry is higher. Therefore, companies may not choose to release proﬁts at that time given the high
adverse selection cost. Furthermore, even if a company with a high stock price supplies more earnings in a bear market, the
market response is relatively small. Although the good news of proﬁtability in a bear market improves investor expectations for
future earnings, it may also increase investor concerns about the uncertainty of the current market situation. Thus risk-averse
investors will ask for a higher expected rate of return. Finally the increased expectation of future earnings brought by good news
will be offset by the effect of a high discount rate.
4 Footnote 3 analyzes two reasons from aspects of information asymmetry and market response in different market cycles.
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motivation during bull markets. Therefore low-proﬁt companies have only limited ability to
choose the market opportunity to release earnings.
2.3. Institutional background in China
The two-part analysis above illustrates the importance of the market value or share
price of listed companies. However, do companies in China’s capital market really care
about the share price and want the share price to rise? Companies listed in developed mar-
kets are subject to more pressure from analyst predictions; when ﬁrm performance fails to
meet predictions, market value plummets, which can ruin managers’ reputations. How-
ever, stock options play a vital role in compensation contracts; therefore, ﬂuctuating stock
prices may result in potential gains and losses for managers. In China, the stock market
analyst industry is still in an early stage of development, the labor market has not fully
developed and the use of stock options is also quite limited.
However, the stock price reﬂects the inherent value of the company and is thus impor-
tant to both listed companies and their stakeholders. The structure of China’s capital mar-
ket is ‘‘big government’’ and ‘‘small market.’’ The healthy development of the stock market
plays a vital role in China’s economic transition and in improving the efﬁciency of resource
allocation. The government is concerned about the stock market; therefore, if the stock in-
dex is too low, the government tends to put forward a series of stimulus policies.5
From the perspective of major shareholders, in contrast to the IPO system in developed
markets, in the China IPOmarket access and pricing mechanisms in the primary issue mar-
ket are strictly regulated.6 Companies require different levels of approval to be listed, and
compete with many other companies. Listing information must be evaluated by audit ﬁrms,
law ﬁrms and assets evaluation agencies authorized by the China Securities Regulatory Com-
mission. Underwriting of stocks should be conducted by authorized underwriters. Informa-
tion should be released via the three designated securities news agencies. These strict
regulations tend to generate considerable economic rent at each step (Liu and Xiong,
2005), which incurs huge costs for companies going public. In addition, limited resources
and the various levels of approval may result in prolonged waiting periods for listed compa-
nies. The uncertainty will lead investors to discount the issue price, which can further in-
crease the company’s listing costs. The huge cost of becoming a listed company is likely to
be compensated for in the secondary market. Consequently, the stock’s performance in the
secondary market is extremely important.5 In 2008, the stock market suffered a sharp downturn. Authorized by the State Council, the Ministry of Finance and
Administration of Taxation decided to adjust the stamp duty rate of the stock market from April 24, from 0.3% to 0.1%. For the
sale, inheritance, or gift of stock transfer books of A shares or B shares, the dealers pay a stamp duty at the rate of 0.1% according
to the deed. Stimulated by these favorable policies of stamp duty adjustment, Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets soared; the
Shanghai Composite Index and Shenzhen Component Index both had showed an increase that exceeded 9%.
6 A quota system on IPO issuance is used in China; that is, the number of new issued shares is decided by the Security
Commission. The provinces and ministries allocate shares listed by companies. In July 1999, the Securities Act was
implemented, which abolished the quota system and advocated an approval system in which companies that meet certain
requirement can be listed; however, the size and price can still be regulated by the SFC. Since 2000, the number of the
companies that met the listing requirements increased suddenly. As a result, the market faced an enormous capacity
increase. In 2001, the Commission started to stipulate the number of channels of all integrated securities ﬁrms and the IPO
issues reported. IPO issuance is still under strict control by the regulatory department. The earliest issue price is decided by
the ﬁxed price to earnings ratio. Later, the Securities Act tried attempted a market-based pricing approach. However, due to
various drawbacks, the pricing mechanism returned to the controlled price-earnings ratio method after 2001.
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(SOE) reform. The market performance of listed companies is one of the most important
criteria to measure the efﬁciency of SOE reform. High stock prices and market value indi-
cate improved efﬁciency. If stock prices suffer from a long-term slump and poor market
performance, major shareholders may need to provide explanations to higher authorities.
Because implicit contracts are relatively common in China, the poor market performance
of a listed company can affect the reputations of senior executives and their political
promotion.
Although most listed companies do not use stock prices for performance evaluation in
compensation contracts, major shareholders and other stakeholders do focus on market
performance; therefore, market value is likely to be a hidden criterion used to evaluate
managers. Further, in different market situations, major shareholders who are concerned
about stock prices may have different expectations. During bull markets, major sharehold-
ers are especially concerned with share prices and market value, primarily because impor-
tant differences exist in the price of every dollar of earnings (PE) and every dollar of net
assets (PB) in different market situations, and a one dollar difference in net proﬁt or net
asset can make a tremendous difference for shareholders.7 When the economy as a whole
is performing well, managers will be under pressure to report positive results. In a bull mar-
ket, the stock market reﬂects prosperity with lower adverse selection costs; stock prices are
generally high and the market constantly meets expectations of price increases. Based on
concerns about future career or political promotions, rational managers should release more
earnings at this time to maximize the market value of their company. Managers who per-
form worse than their peers will be penalized by the capital markets if their reported earn-
ings fail to meet expectations. So in a bull market, executives who do not choose to release
earnings are more likely to be punished or dismissed by major shareholders.
Based on the this theoretical analysis and institutional background, we put forward the
following hypotheses: (1) Listed companies choose to release more earnings during bull
markets. (2) During bull markets, companies with higher valuations release more earn-
ings. (3) During bull markets, high-proﬁt companies release more earnings. (4) The less
earnings a manager releases during bull markets, the more likely he will be replaced.3. Sample, data and descriptive statistics
3.1. Sample and data
The data used in this study was obtained from the China Center for Economic Research
(CCER) economic and ﬁnancial research database and Wind Datafeed Service (WIND data-
base). Financial data from 1994 to 2008 was obtained from the CCER ﬁnancial database of
general listed companies (missing data was obtained from the WIND database, including
information on listed companies that were suspended or delisted); the stock market index
was obtained from the CCER stock market index database; ﬁxed assets data from 2007 and
2008 was obtained from the WIND database.7 For example, after controlling for other conditions, company A earns $1 per share, Company B earns $2 per share. The market
valuation is generally low in a bear market. Assuming that the price–earnings ratio of both company A and company B is 10,
then the difference in shareholder wealth between Company A and Company B to earn $1 per share is $10. In a bull market,
stocks tend to have a high PE/PB; assuming that the price-to-earnings ratio of both company A and company B is 30, then the
difference in shareholder wealth between Company A and Company B to earn $1 per share is $30. Thus, in a bull market,
releasing one more dollar of earnings can have a tremendous inﬂuence on shareholder wealth and market value.
Table 1
Sample by year and market.
Year Shenzhen market Shanghai market Sample size Percentage
1995 54 64 118 1.33
1996 55 118 173 1.94
1997 110 173 283 3.18
1998 186 234 420 4.72
1999 220 273 493 5.54
2000 256 306 562 6.31
2001 296 384 680 7.64
2002 297 449 746 8.38
2003 298 511 809 9.09
2004 298 572 870 9.77
2005 298 628 926 10.40
2006 297 632 929 10.43
2007 295 646 941 10.57
2008 294 659 953 10.70
Total 3254 5649 8903
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selected all of the 15,367 observations of A-share listed companies from 1994 to 2008 on
the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from the CCER ﬁnancial data-
base (except ﬁnance and insurance companies). To ensure the validity of the study, sample
selection was carried out as follows.
1. We excluded 700 observations from the mid- and small-cap market.
2. To calculate the 1995–1997 operating cash ﬂow, we used data from previous years; data
from the previous year was matched with the year studied. We removed IPO companies
from the current year that had no prior-year data and removed companies that were
delisted and had only prior year data without current year data. As a result, 1371 obser-
vations were removed from the remaining sample.
3. We excluded companies that were delisted or suspended in the study year, resulting in
1297 observations being removed from the remaining sample.
4. We excluded companies that had been given or were at the time being given special
treatment in the study year, resulting in 3032 observations being removed from the
remaining sample.
5. We excluded companies with leverage ratios >1 (two observations) and PB ratios <0
(two observations).
6. We excluded companies where sales data was missing (two observations) and net value
of accounts receivable data was missing (58 observations);
The ﬁnal sample includes 8903 observations. To eliminate extreme values, all continu-
ous variables were winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The ﬁnal sample period in this
study is from 1995 to 2008. Table 1 shows the distribution by year and stock exchange
of the sample observations.
This study measures several aspects of earnings management, including discretionary
accruals. We use a cross-sectional approach to estimate accrual models. According to
the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) industry classiﬁcation published in
2001, all companies were divided into 21 industry categories. The manufacturing sector
Table 2
Industry distribution.
Code Industry Sample size Percentage
A Agriculture, forestry, livestock farming, ﬁshery 177 1.99
B Mining 131 1.47
C0 Food and beverage 413 4.64
C1 Textiles and apparel 358 4.02
C3 Paper and printing 141 1.58
C4 Petrochemicals 1042 11.7
C5 Electronic 302 3.39
C6 Metals and nonmetals 814 9.14
C7 Machinery 1291 14.5
C8 Pharmaceuticals 563 6.32
C9 Other manufacturing 123 1.38
D Utilities 503 5.65
E Construction 189 2.12
F Transportation 406 4.56
G Information technology 427 4.8
H Wholesale and retail trade 790 8.87
J Real estate 392 4.4
K Social services 307 3.45
L Communication and culture industry 56 0.63
M Comprehensive 478 5.37
Total 8903 100
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code. As there were few observations in C2 (wood, furniture) they were combined with C9
(other industries). The industry distribution of the sample is shown in Table 2.
3.2. Deﬁnition of variables
3.2.1. Earnings management
The main variables used in this study are deﬁned in Table 3. As we refer to previous
studies that measure earnings management, for comparable results, we use DAadj, Daks,
BL, and EI as the four measurements. We used the cross-sectional modiﬁed Jones model
(Dechow et al., 1995) to calculate discretionary accruals 1(DAadj), by regressing estimated
industry characteristic parameters as follows:
The ﬁrst step is to calculate total accruals TAt/At18 Sin
to cal
assets
shorta
increa
term b
in unpTAt=At1 ¼ ðOIt  CFOtÞ=At1: ð1Þ
TAt/At1 is total accruals in year t adjusted by total assets in year t1, which excludes be-
low-the-line items, OIt is operating income in year t, and CFOt is net cash ﬂow from oper-
ating activities8 in year t. At1 is total assets in year t1.
The second step estimates industry characteristic parameters a1, a2, a3TAt=At1 ¼ a1ð1=At1Þ þ a2ðDREVt=At1Þ þ a3ðPPEt=At1Þ þ et: ð2Þce listed companies in China began to disclose cash ﬂow statements in 1998, we use the adjustment method of Lu (1999)
culate cash ﬂow data prior to 1998: Cash ﬂow from operating activities = Net income + Depreciation of ﬁxed
+ Amortization of intangible assets, Deferred assets, and Other assets + The amount of net ﬁxed assets inventory
ge + Net loss of disposal of ﬁxed assets + Deferred tax credits + Financial expenses  Investment income  (Amount of
se in current assets  the Amount of monetary capital increase  Increase in short-term investments  Increase in long-
ond investments due within 1 year) + (Amount of increase in current liabilities  Increase in short-term loans  Increase
aid dividends  the Amount of long-term debt due within 1 year increase).
Table 3
Deﬁnitions of the main variables.
Variable name Symbol Variable deﬁnitions
Discretionary accruals 1 DAadj Used cross-sectional version of the modiﬁed/Jones model to calculate discretionary
accruals, calculation is shown below
Discretionary accruals 2 DAks Used cross-sectional modiﬁed/KS model to calculate discretionary accruals,
calculation is shown below
Below-the-line items BL (Total income  operating income)/total assets at t  1, adjusted by industry
median
Extraordinary items EI Extraordinary proﬁt and lossa/total assets at t  1, adjusted by industry median
Bull market Market Market is 1 if the observation is in a bull market, otherwise 0; a detailed diagnosis of
the bull and bear markets is shown below
Proﬁtability HPI Core return on net assets, operating income/net assets, adjusted by industry median
Market valuation HPB Price-to-book, end closing price/book value of net assets per share, adjusted by
industry median
Management change Change Change is 1 if the chief executive ofﬁcer or chairman change in the year t, otherwise
0
CEO change CEO CEO is 1 if the chief executive ofﬁcer changes in the year t, otherwise 0
Size Size Natural logarithm of total assets
Financial leverage Lev Total liabilities/total assets
Property characteristics State State is 1 if the actual controller of the sample company is private or other, state is 0
if the actual controller of the sample company is state-owned
Equity issue PG PG is 1 if the company reﬁnanced in year t + 1, otherwise 0
Region Region Region is 1 if the company is located in the eastern region, otherwise 0
Operating performance ROA Net income/total assets
a Because the annual reporting of extraordinary items only began in 1999, extraordinary items for 1995–1998 are mea-
sured by total income minus operating income instead.
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mated separately for each industry. TAt is the total accruals of company i in year t, exclud-
ing below-the-line items, DREVt is the difference between sales for company i in year t and
year t  1; PPEt is the value of the plant, equipment and other ﬁxed assets of company i at
the end of year t; and et is the residual error representing the discretionary accruals. At1 is
total assets in year t  1.
The third step is to calculate nondiscretionary accruals NDAt/At1NDAt=At1 ¼ a1ð1=At1Þ þ a2½ðDREVt  DRECtÞ=At1 þ a3ðPPEt=At1Þ: ð3Þ
Nondiscretionary accruals are calculated by putting the industry characteristic parame-
ters a1, a2, a3 estimated in Eq. (2) into Eq. (3). NDAt/At1 represents nondiscretionary
accruals of company i in year t adjusted by total assets in year t  1, DRECt is the difference
between accounts receivable of the company i for the year t and year t  1, and the other
variables are the same as in Eq. (2).
The fourth step is to calculate discretionary accruals DAadjtDAadjt ¼ TAt=At1  NDAt=At1: ð4Þ
Discretionary accruals equal the total accruals, which were calculated in Eq. (1), minus
nondiscretionary accruals, which were estimated in Eq. (3).
Discretionary accruals 2 (Daks) are calculated using the modiﬁed/KS model (Kang and
Sivaramakrishnan, 1995), and the regression is estimated for each industry as follows.
The ﬁrst step is to calculate total accruals TAt/At1TAt=At1 ¼ ðOIt  CFOtÞ=At1: ð5Þ
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According to Eq. (6), we obtain estimates a1, a2, a3, a4 of a1, a2, a3, a4, respectively. The
regression is estimated for each industry. REVt is the sale of company i in year t, COSTt rep-
resents the costs of company i in year t.
The third step is to calculate nondiscretionary accruals NDAt/At1NDAt=At1 ¼ a1ð1=At1Þ þ a2ðREVt=At1Þ þ a3ðCOSTt=At1Þ þ a4ðPPEt=At1Þ ð7Þ
Nondiscretionary accruals are calculated by putting the industry characteristic parameters
a1, a2, a3, a4 estimated in Eq. (6) into Eq. (7).
The fourth step is to calculate the discretionary accruals DAkstDAkst ¼ TAt=At1  NDAt=At1: ð8Þ
Discretionary accruals are equal to total accruals, which were calculated in Eq. (5) minus
nondiscretionary accruals, which were estimated in Eq. (7).
Generally, companies manage earnings through accruals. However, listed companies in
China also manage earnings through below-the-line items such as related party transac-
tions and asset disposals (Chen and Yuan, 2004). Therefore, in this paper we also use be-
low-the-line items (BL) as a proxy for earnings management. Meanwhile, previous studies
(Wei et al., 2007) show that extraordinary proﬁt and loss9 are important for earnings man-
agement in China, so we also choose extraordinary proﬁt and loss (EI) as another
measurement.
3.2.2. Main explanatory variables: stock market situation
To diagnose the bull and bear market cycle, we use the approach of He and Zhou (2006)
with appropriate adjustments.10 As the sample data in this study is from 1995 to 2008, we
diagnose the market situation from January 1995 to December 2008, using the monthly
stock market index Pt as follows:
First, ﬁnd peaks and troughs according to Eqs. (9) and (10):
t is a peak time, if Pt is the maximum price within a 5-month window;Pt5;^; Pt1 < Pt > Ptþ1;^; Ptþ5; ð9Þ
t is a trough time, if Pt is the minimum price within a 5-month window;Pt5;^; Pt1 > Pt < Ptþ1;^; Ptþ5: ð10Þ
Further diagnostic requirements: (1) eliminate the lower of the continuous peaks and the
higher of the continuous troughs to show alternating peaks and troughs; (2) if the duration
of a bull market or a bear market lasts no more than 6 months, prices must rise or fall more
than 20% when prices reverse; (3) remove peaks and troughs less than 6 months from the
ends; (4) exclude peaks near the endpoints that are lower than the price at the endpoints,
and exclude troughs near the endpoints that are higher than the price at the endpoints;
(5) exclude bull and bear market cycles that last less than 10 months.raordinary proﬁt and loss are deﬁned as gains/losses that are not related to companies’ regular business or occasional
me gains and losses, such as the impairment of assets caused by natural disasters, gains and losses of ﬁxed asset disposal,
nd losses of debt restructuring, ﬁnancial return, and subsidies income. It is a disclosure item for listed companies and will
ected in items such as investment income, nonoperating income, nonoperating expenses, prior year income adjustment,
ement expenses, and ﬁnancial expenses.
and Zhou (2006) use a 3-month price window to diagnose market cycles to avoid missing short-term peaks and troughs.
study, we needed to judge the market situation in a special year after the peaks and troughs diagnosis. So we use a 5-
price window applied to the business cycle diagnosis (Bry and Boschan, 1971). We also use a 3-month price window for
agnosis; the basic cycles are the same, but it can more effectively diagnose short-term bull and bear markets.
Table 4
Market situation: Diagnosis of the bull and bear markets.
Shanghai composite index Shenzhen component index
Time Price index Status Year Market situation Time Price index Status Year Market situation
199 509 741 Peak 1995 Bull 1995 Bear
199 602 530 Trough 1996 Bull 199 601 958 Trough 1996 Bull
1997 Bull 199 705 5336 Peak 1997 Bear
199 806 1383 Peak 1998 Bear 1998 Bear
199 902 1101 Trough 1999 Bull 199 905 2800 Trough 1999 Bull
2000 Bull 200 008 4962 Peak 2000 Bull
200 106 2214 Peak 2001 Bear 2001 Bear
2002 Bear 200 212 2845 Trough 2002 Bear
200 311 1361 Trough 2003 Bear 2003 Bull
200 403 1708 Peak 2004 Bear 200 403 3985 Peak 2004 Bear
200 507 1042 Trough 2005 Bear 200 511 2683 Trough 2005 Bear
200 710 5824 Peak 2006 Bull 200 710 18,966 Peak 2006 Bull
2007 2007
200 811 1876 Trough 2008 Bear 200 811 6310 Trough 2008 Bear
222 D. Chen et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 4 (2011) 211–232This study selects companies listed on the A-share main board market on the Shanghai
Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. We use monthly prices of the Shanghai
Composite Index and the Shenzhen Component Index to diagnose bull and bear markets.
Table 4 shows the market situation of the Shanghai Composite Index and the Shenzhen
Component Index. Diagnostic results show that from January 1995 to December 2008,
the Shanghai Composite Index experienced ﬁve peaks and ﬁve troughs (ﬁve bull and bear
market cycles), whereas the Shenzhen Component Index experienced four peaks and ﬁve
troughs (four bull and bear market cycles). There is a synergistic effect between the two
markets. On average, bull markets were longer in the Shanghai Composite Index, whereas
bear markets were longer in the Shenzhen Component Index.
The Information Disclosure of Listed Companies stipulates that companies whose stocks
or bonds are publicly traded are obliged to comply with continuous information disclosure.
The main form of disclosure is periodic reports, including annual reports, semi-annual re-
ports and quarterly reports. Annual reports should be disclosed within 4 months after the
end of each ﬁscal year, semi-annual reports should be disclosed within 2 months after the
end of the ﬁrst half of each ﬁscal year and quarterly reports should be disclosed within a
month after the end of the ﬁrst 3 months and 9 months of each ﬁscal year. If the bull market
(or bear market) ended in the ﬁrst half of a year whenmost listed companies disclosed only
ﬁrst quarter reports, listed companies can manage earnings through semi-annual reports,
third quarter reports and annual reports according to themarket situation of the second half
of the year. If the bull market (or bear market) ends in the second half of a year when most
listed companies have already disclosed the ﬁrst quarter reports, semi-annual reports or
even third quarter reports, it is difﬁcult to use last quarter reports only to reverse the
direction of earnings management.
Therefore, we judge that if the bull market (or bear market) ended in the ﬁrst half of the
year, then the market situation is the trend in the second half of the year, namely a bear
market (or bull market); if the bull market (or bear market) ended in the second half of the
year, then the market situation is the trend in the ﬁrst half of the year, namely a bull mar-
ket (or bear market). According to the diagnosis results of Table 4, the variable Market is 1
if the sample observation is in a bull market, otherwise 0.
Table 5
Descriptive statistics.
Variables N Mean Median P25 P75 MIN MAX Standard
DAadj 8903 0.0017 0.0024 0.0444 0.0409 0.2452 0.3210 0.0881
DAks 8903 0.0035 0.0065 0.0492 0.0358 0.2473 0.3026 0.0859
BL 8903 0.0051 0.0000 0.0036 0.0090 0.0417 0.0944 0.0181
EI 8903 0.0048 0.0000 0.0026 0.0070 0.0331 0.0844 0.0158
Market 8903 0.4081 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4915
HPI 8903 0.0017 0.0000 0.0453 0.0500 0.3975 0.3147 0.0942
HPB 8903 0.6686 0.0000 0.9166 1.5248 3.4743 10.7078 2.3012
Change 8903 0.3879 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4873
CEO 8903 0.3046 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4603
Asset 8903 9.2744 9.2206 8.9766 9.5255 8.4376 10.6117 0.4286
Lev 8903 0.4550 0.4629 0.3339 0.5839 0.0741 0.8066 0.1691
State 8903 0.2011 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4008
PG 8903 0.1018 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.3024
Region 8903 0.4579 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4983
ROA 8903 0.0360 0.0287 0.0097 0.0563 0.0896 0.1681 0.0401
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Table 5 lists descriptive statistics for the main variables. The average company’s discre-
tionary accruals DAadj and Daks are 0.17% and 0.35% of total assets, respectively, and the
maximum discretionary accruals are 32.10% and 30.26% of total assets, respectively. The
average industry-adjusted below-the-line item income is 0.51% of total assets, and the
average of industry-adjusted extraordinary proﬁt and loss is 0.48% of total assets. The pro-
portion of listed companies that changed their CEOs or Chairman accounted for 38.79% ofTable 6
Earnings management in different market situations.
Variables N Mean Median P25 P75 MIN MAX Standard
Panel A: Descriptive statistics
Earnings management in bull markets
DAadj 3633 0.0070 0.0012 0.0429 0.0478 0.2452 0.3210 0.0927
DAks 3633 0.0020 0.0024 0.0470 0.0428 0.2473 0.3026 0.0902
BL 3633 0.0072 0.0010 0.0029 0.0118 0.0417 0.0943 0.0193
EI 3633 0.0074 0.0015 0.0020 0.0105 0.0313 0.0844 0.0180
Earnings management in bear markets
DAadj 5270 0.0019 0.0046 0.0456 0.0363 0.2452 0.3210 0.0845
DAks 5270 0.0073 0.0093 0.0508 0.0314 0.2473 0.3026 0.0826
BL 5270 0.0036 0.0006 0.0040 0.0075 0.0417 0.0944 0.0170
EI 5270 0.0030 0.0007 0.0029 0.0048 0.0331 0.0844 0.0138
Panel B: Median and mean tests of earnings management in bull vs bear markets
Mean test Median test
T Pr(|T| > |t|) Z Prob > |z|
DAadj 4.6970⁄⁄⁄ 0.0000 4.325⁄⁄⁄ 0.0000
DAks 5.0019⁄⁄⁄ 0.0000 4.681⁄⁄⁄ 0.0000
BL 9.2357⁄⁄⁄ 0.0000 9.657⁄⁄⁄ 0.0000
EI 13.3035⁄⁄⁄ 0.0000 14.146⁄⁄⁄ 0.0000
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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30.46% of the sample. State-owned companies accounted for almost 80% of the sample
companies.
According to our predictions, listed companies choose to release more earnings in bull
markets. Thus earningsmanagement (DAadj,DAks, BL and EI) in bullmarkets should be high-
er than that of bearmarkets on average. Table 6 compares earningsmanagement in different
market situations. Panel A shows that mean discretionary accruals DAadj and Daks released
are 0.007 and 0.002 during bull markets, and median discretionary accruals are 0.0012 and
0.0024. During bearmarkets,meandiscretionary accrualsDAadj andDaks are0.0019 and
0.0073, and median discretionary accruals are 0.0046 and 0.0093. The mean (median)
of below-the-line items (BL) is 0.0072 (0.0010) during bull markets and 0.0036 (0.0006)
during bear markets. The mean (median) of extraordinary proﬁt and loss (EI) is 0.0074
(0.0015) during bullmarkets and 0.0030 (0.0007) during bearmarkets. These results show
that listed companies release more proﬁts during bull markets. Panel B also shows that sig-
niﬁcantly more earnings were released during bull markets than bear markets (p < 0.01),
providing further evidence that listed companies release earnings according to the market
situation and release more earnings during bull market cycles.4. Model and empirical results
4.1. Timing earnings tests
To analyze whether listed companies use the market timing approach to earnings man-
agement, we use the following regression model (1) clustered by industry:Table 7
Corre
DAa
DAk
BL
EI
Mar
The uEM ¼ b0 þ b1Market þ b2Asset þ b3Lev þ b4Stateþ b5PGþ b6Regionþ b7ROAþ e:
ðmodel1Þwhere EM is the level of earnings management involving four indicators DAadj, Daks, BL
and EI. The main test variableMarket is the market situation, a dummy variable that equals
1 during bull markets. According to our hypotheses, b1 is expected to be positive. Referring
to previous studies on earnings management (Bo and Wu, 2009; Chen et al., 2000; Lin and
Wei, 2000; Lu, 1999; Wei et al., 2007), we also use Size, LEV, State, PG, Region, and ROA as
control variables.lations.
DAadj DAks BL EI Market
dj 1.0000
s 0.9642 1.0000
0.0000
0.0055 0.0054 1.0000
0.6070 0.6084
0.0752 0.0850 0.6665 1.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
ket 0.0497 0.0529 0.0974 0.1396 1.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
pper values are correlation coefﬁcients and the lowers are P values.
Table 8
Test results on timing earnings.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
DAadj DAks BL EI
Market 0.0069*** 0.0078*** 0.0028*** 0.0039***
(3.534) (3.899) (8.403) (8.276)
Asset 0.0181** 0.0081 0.0040*** 0.0044***
(2.688) (1.523) (3.430) (6.220)
Lev 0.0205 0.0239** 0.0058*** 0.0040***
(1.443) (2.578) (3.081) (2.963)
State 0.0071*** 0.0040* 0.0024*** 0.0009**
(3.109) (1.870) (3.360) (2.742)
PG 0.0018 0.0003 0.0012** 0.0010
(0.521) (0.0779) (2.105) (1.620)
Region 0.0007 0.0029 0.0056*** 0.0040***
(0.214) (1.174) (7.332) (7.009)
ROA 0.4188*** 0.3212*** 0.1406*** 0.0796***
(9.131) (9.397) (5.831) (6.137)
Constant 0.1762** 0.0824 0.0315** 0.0378***
(2.644) (1.699) (2.854) (5.990)
Observations 8903 8903 8903 8903
R2 0.049 0.032 0.131 0.087
F test 39.62*** 39.72*** 29.78*** 21.65***
Robust t-statistic in parentheses.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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Market (bull market) is positively related with earnings management measures (DAadj,
Daks, BL, and EI).
Table 8 shows the regression results of the timing earnings test. We use discretionary
accruals, DAadj and DAks, as dependent variables in Columns (1) and (2). After controlling
for other related variables, the coefﬁcient of Market (bull market) is positive (p < 0.01).
These results indicate that listed companies release more earnings through accrual items
during bull markets. The results of Columns (3) and (4), which use BL and EI as dependent
variables, respectively, also show that below-the-line income (BL) and extraordinary proﬁt
and loss (EI) are signiﬁcantly higher during bull markets than during bear markets. Listed
companies release more earnings through below-the-line or extraordinary items during
bull markets. Results of Columns (1)–(4) indicate that listed companies use a market tim-
ing approach to manage earnings and release more earnings during bull markets.4.2. Additional tests: Company characteristics and timing earnings
Test 4.1 shows that listed companies time their earnings management in different mar-
ket cycles. But, how do differences in company characteristics inﬂuence market timing
behavior? In this section, we further analyze this question from two aspects: market val-
uation and proﬁtability of listed companies.
We use HPB to indicate highly valued stocks, which is the price-to-book ratio (PB)
adjusted by the industry median, and use core return on equity (operating income/
equity) adjusted by industry median as proxy for ﬁrm proﬁtability, with variable name
HPI. Then we establish Model (2) on the basis of Model (1), and carry out regressions
Table 9
Market valuation effects on timing earnings.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
DAadj DAks BL EI
Market 0.0042** 0.0057*** 0.0025*** 0.0034***
(2.440) (3.160) (6.338) (6.795)
Market  HPB 0.0025* 0.0024* 0.0003** 0.0005***
(1.895) (1.837) (2.281) (3.067)
HPB 0.0008 0.0011 0.0001 0.0003
(0.886) (1.434) (0.833) (1.714)
Asset 0.0181** 0.0076 0.0041*** 0.0046***
(2.701) (1.403) (3.632) (6.808)
Lev 0.0215 0.0239** 0.0058*** 0.0040***
(1.431) (2.429) (3.122) (3.440)
State 0.0069*** 0.0038* 0.0024*** 0.0010***
(2.993) (1.763) (3.404) (2.907)
PG 0.0016 0.0002 0.0012** 0.0009
(0.471) (0.0558) (2.148) (1.616)
Region 0.0007 0.0029 0.0056*** 0.0040***
(0.225) (1.104) (7.190) (6.890)
ROA 0.4162*** 0.3232*** 0.1406*** 0.0801***
(8.725) (9.244) (5.740) (5.927)
Constant 0.1753** 0.0775 0.0319*** 0.0390***
(2.652) (1.577) (3.014) (6.515)
Observations 8903 8903 8903 8903
R2 0.050 0.033 0.131 0.089
F test 37.12*** 50.15*** 26.50*** 18.08***
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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high-proﬁt ﬁrms or ﬁrms with high valuations release more earnings during bull
markets.EM ¼ b0 þ b1Market þ b2Market  HPBðMarket  HPIÞ þ b3HPBðHPIÞ
þ b4Asset þ b5Lev þ b6Stateþ b7PGþ b8Regionþ b9ROAþ e: ðmodel2ÞTable 9 shows market valuation effects on the timing of earnings behavior. Columns
(1)–(4) in Table 9 show that the coefﬁcient of the market cycle variable Market (bull
market) is positive, and the coefﬁcient of Market  HPB is also positive. These results
indicate that highly valued companies release more earnings in bull markets. However,
the coefﬁcient of market valuation (HPB) is not signiﬁcant (p > 0.01), which suggests that
during bear market cycles, even highly valued companies do not choose to release more
earnings.
Table 10 shows the effects of company proﬁtability on the timing of earnings behav-
ior. In Columns (1) and (2) with discretionary accruals (DAadj, DAks) as the dependent
variables, the coefﬁcient of the market cycle variable Market (bull market) is
signiﬁcantly positive, and the coefﬁcients on the interaction terms Market  HPI are
0.0656 (p < 0.05) and 0.0593 (p < 0.10), respectively. These results indicate that compa-
nies with higher proﬁtability release more earnings during bull markets. Columns (3)
and (4), using BL and EI as dependent variables, The results in Column (4) show that
Table 10
Company proﬁtability effects on timing earnings.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
DAadj DAks BL EI
Market 0.0050** 0.0062*** 0.0037*** 0.0042***
(2.822) (3.542) (10.70) (9.229)
Market⁄HPI 0.0656** 0.0593* 0.0058 0.0051
(2.112) (1.824) (0.935) (0.976)
HPI 0.2036*** 0.1587*** 0.1141*** 0.0504***
(9.431) (9.681) (9.472) (7.164)
Asset 0.0102 0.0019 0.0001 0.0028***
(1.551) (0.311) (0.106) (3.918)
Lev 0.0382*** 0.0379*** 0.0149*** 0.0078***
(3.000) (4.169) (6.152) (5.394)
State 0.0021 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001
(0.781) (0.0157) (0.267) (0.311)
PG 0.0017 0.0026 0.0002 0.0014**
(0.589) (0.777) (0.370) (2.292)
Region 0.0011 0.0015 0.0047*** 0.0037***
(0.332) (0.627) (6.782) (7.054)
ROA 0.0426 0.0233 0.3338*** 0.1606***
(0.923) (0.543) (8.840) (7.537)
Constant 0.0808 0.0064 0.0160 0.0184**
(1.248) (0.115) (1.324) (2.673)
Observations 8903 8903 8903 8903
R2 0.081 0.053 0.320 0.130
F test 390.25*** 127.66*** 33.31*** 23.25***
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
D. Chen et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 4 (2011) 211–232 227listed companies indeed use a market timing approach to manage earnings during bull
markets. However, the coefﬁcients on the interaction terms (Market  HPI), are not sig-
niﬁcant (p > 0.10).11
4.3. Tests of the consequences of failure to time earnings
In bull markets, with low adverse selection costs, investors are generally willing to pay
higher prices for stocks, and demand exceeds supply. Rational executives should choose to
release more earnings in such a situation. Executives who fail to release earnings at these
times may be punished or even dismissed by rational large shareholders. To test the con-
sequences of the failure of managers to time earnings, we use the following logistic regres-
sion model (3) clustered by industry:11 In
Comp
bull mChangeðCEOÞ¼b0þb1Marketþb2MarketEMþb3EMþb4Assetþb5Lev
þb6Stateþb7Regionþb8ROAþe ðmodel3Þfurther robustness tests, we divide the sample into high- and low-proﬁt groups, using BL and EI as dependent variables.
arison of the coefﬁcients of Market (bull market) in the two groups show that high-proﬁt groups release more earnings in
arkets than low-proﬁt groups.
Table 11
Consequences of failure to time earnings.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Change Change CEO CEO
Market 0.3100*** 0.2835*** 0.3116*** 0.2877***
(4.495) (3.831) (4.371) (3.727)
Market  HDAadj 0.1104* 0.1428⁄
(1.661) (1.946)
HDAadj 0.0656 0.0487
(1.221) (0.819)
Market  HDAks 0.0559 0.0929
(0.679) (0.944)
HDAks 0.1003* 0.0758
(1.891) (1.229)
Asset 0.1307 0.1347 0.1685 0.1727
(1.564) (1.626) (1.546) (1.609)
Lev 0.1157 0.1165 0.1052 0.1051
(0.686) (0.686) (0.691) (0.696)
State 0.1996*** 0.2019*** 0.0462 0.0484
(3.391) (3.399) (0.614) (0.641)
Region 0.0670 0.0680 0.1049* 0.1058*
(0.965) (0.985) (1.648) (1.668)
ROA 1.9459*** 1.9814*** 1.5525** 1.5937**
(2.688) (2.791) (2.011) (2.095)
Constant 0.8726 0.9293 0.8177 0.8721
(1.157) (1.230) (0.814) (0.870)
Observations 7905 7905 7905 7905
Wald v2 96.86*** 101.35*** 47.99*** 30.53***
Pseudo R2 0.0063 0.0063 0.0055 0.0054
HDAadj equals 1 if discretionary accruals DAadj is higher than the industry median, otherwise 0. HDAks equals 1 if discre-
tionary accruals DAks is higher than the industry median, otherwise 0. Robust z-statistics in parentheses.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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EM stands for the level of earnings released, which is represented by HDAadj, HDAks.12 If
DAadj is higher than the industry median, then HDAadj equals 1, otherwise 0. If DAks exceeds
industry median, then HDAks equals 1, otherwise 0. According to our predictions, b2, the
coefﬁcient of the interaction term (Market  EM) is expected to be negative. The more earn-12 We use discretionary accruals as dependent variables only to analyze the consequences of the failure of managers to time
earnings for the following reasons. Due to information asymmetry and incompleteness of contracts, accounting standards allow
executives to make professional judgments, such as decisions about future affairs, choices of accounting methods, and
judgments on deferred revenues. Based on their understanding of economic transactions, executives can choose accounting
methods, estimations, and report forms that ﬁt the economic situation. The effects of these judgments are represented in accrual
items. Compared with below-the-line items (BL) or extraordinary items (EI) within contracts, using professional judgments to
manage earnings can be a more regular choice for executives. Specially, during bull markets, investors generally hold higher
expectations, and chief shareholders may prefer executives to use professional judgment to manage earnings; executives who
fail to do this might be punished. BL and EI are also important means of earnings management, but they are not regular choices
and are sometimes restrained. For example, security regulation departments in China have issued regulations that make it
necessary to account for the inﬂuences of extraordinary proﬁt and loss in reporting proﬁts and calculating ﬁnancial ratios, such
as ROA. Since 2001, CSRC has required companies applying for reﬁnancing to have a weighted average ROA higher than 6% for
the previous 3 years. The calculation of weighted average ROA uses the lower of income and income deducting extraordinary
proﬁt and loss. We also tried to use BL and EI as dependent variables to test the consequences of failure of market timing, and
found that lower BL and EI in bull markets do not induce punishment such as dismissal.
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This prediction indicates that executives who fail to release earnings during bull markets will
be punished or even be dismissed by major shareholders.
Table 11 shows the consequences of failure of managers to time earnings. Using execu-
tives change (Change) as the dependent variable in Columns (1) and (2), the coefﬁcients on
Market are positive (p < 0.01). After adding the interaction terms, the results in Column (1)
show that the coefﬁcient of Market ⁄ HDAadj is 0.1104 (p < 0.10), indicating that execu-
tives are less likely to be dismissed if they release more earnings during bull markets.
The results in Column (2) show that the coefﬁcient on Market ⁄ HDAks is negative, but is
not signiﬁcant (p > 0.10). We use the change of CEOs (CEO) only as the dependent variable
in Columns (3) and (4), and the results show that the coefﬁcients on the interaction term
Market  HDAadj are signiﬁcantly negative (p < 0.10), indicating that a CEO will not be dis-
missed if he/she releases more earnings during bull markets. In other words, a CEO who
fails to release earnings according to the market situation is more likely to be dismissed.
The results in Column (4) show that the coefﬁcient of Market ⁄ HDAks is not signiﬁcant
(p > 0.10).13
4.4. Robustness tests
We also performed the following robustness tests. First, we add the lagged total accruals
(TAt1) as a control variable to the regression models with discretionary accruals (DAadj,
Daks) as dependent variables. Because of the reversal feature, current accruals can be inﬂu-
enced by lagged accruals, and we add TAt1 to regression models as a control variable. Sec-
ond, to test the effects of market valuation on timing earnings behavior, we use the median
industry price-to-earnings ratio (PE) at year t, adjusted by the industry median PE of all
sample years, as the market valuation proxy. Third, to test the effects of company charac-
teristics on the timing of earnings, we divide the total sample into groups of high- and
low-proﬁt companies and groups of high- and low-valuation stocks for further tests. We
also divide the total sample into groups of bull markets and bear markets to test whether
executives and CEOs are more likely to be dismissed if they do not release more earnings
during bull markets. The results of all these robustness tests support the hypotheses.5. Conclusion and limitations
Over time, stock markets exhibit periodic ﬂuctuations, experiencing bull and bear mar-
kets. Adverse selection costs, supply and demand relationships and asymmetric market re-
sponses under different market situations inﬂuence the earnings management behavior of
companies. This study uses 8903 observations from the A-share stock markets in China
from 1995 to 2008 to analyze the market timing of earnings management. The results
show that listed companies choose to release more earnings during bull markets, and this
phenomenon is more evident in high-proﬁt enterprises than in low-proﬁt enterprises.
From the microenterprise perspective, highly valued enterprises also release more
earnings during bull markets. Finally, we ﬁnd that executives who do not release more
earnings during bull markets are more likely to be dismissed.13 In further robust tests, we divided total samples into bull markets and bear markets groups, using CEO as dependent
variables. The coefﬁcients of HDAks in bull markets is signiﬁcantly negative (p < 0.05),while the coefﬁcients of HDAks in bear
markets is negative, but is not signiﬁcant (p > 0.10) .Results show that a CEO who fails to release proper earnings in bull markets
is more likely to be dismissed.
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and below-the-line items; ﬁrms can also manage earnings through real economic transac-
tions (Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Roychowdhury, 2006), such as staff training, cuts in re-
search and development and advertising, postponing new projects, cuts in soft expenses
such as travel budgets, discounts to increase orders, and raising product prices during
the ﬁrst quarter of the year. Due to the proxy for earnings management used in this study,
we are not able to completely describe the characteristics of real transaction-based earn-
ings management under different stock market cycles.Acknowledgments
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